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1. Introduction 
!
“What if the skin were not a container? What if the skin were not a limit at which 
self begins and ends? What if the skin were a porous, topological surfacing of 
myriad potential strata that field the relation between different milieus, each of 
them a multiplicity of insides and outsides? (Manning 2013 p1-2).  
We begin with the above quotation from Erin Manning’s book Always more than one: Indi-
viduation’s Dance, because in many ways, it sums up the key issue that we hope to ad-
dress in this chapter. Manning, like many other post-structuralist and post-humanist 
thinkers, argues for a new model of the body (understood as a material and visceral set of 
biological components and functions) and a new way of theorizing and conceptualizing 
embodiment (how humans experience the world through their specifically placed and lo-
cated bodies). Manning emphasises the need to overcome a model of the body, and self, 
as a contained entity and a notion of the human as the measure and measurer of all 
things. Manning’s viewpoint chimes with a broader literature on post-humanism, which ar-
gues that the body is less a determined biological entity (as in humanism) and more an 
open and plastic boundary whose basic condition is change, porosity and augmentation 
(see, for example, Hayles 2012, Wolfe 2010, Malabou 2008).  
To take posthuman and poststructuralist critiques of the body as a container seriously, re-
quires a shift in our methodological imaginary and the vocabularies we use to express that 
imaginary. If posthumanism is keen to emphasise non-human objects—such as technolo-
gy (Hayles 1999), microbacterial life (Bradiotti 2013) and animals (Haraway 2003) —as 
central to our sensory experiences of the world, then any vocabulary of embodied 
methodology should be able to describe and analyse sensory experience in ways that do 
not begin and end with experience as organised by an autonomous human subject. In 
other words, a posthuman methodology would be able to analyse how bodies engage with 
their environments in ways that don’t prioritize or privilege particular individual human 
senses or faculties over the vast array of non-human objects which shape and enable 
these faculties. For example, in the event of a door slamming our senses are engaged in 
multiple interconnected ways. We do not see the door, then hear the door, then feel the 
door as a series of discrete perceptions; we see-hear-feel the door as one moment or 
movement of change in an environment. At the same time, to understand our experience 
of the door slamming also requires an understanding of how the door hits the door frame 
to generate the forces that inform the embodied experience of the slamming door. 
The chapter develops a vocabulary to understand the multiple relations between human 
bodies and their environments from the language of sound, organised around the umbrella 
concept of attunement. Attunement can be understood as a basic way of sensing the world 
before we organise it through internal self-narration, the representational logics of lan-
guage or a theoretical account of the senses as a series of discrete faculties. A method-
ological imaginary based on sound, we argue, allows us to attend to the crossings that oc-
cur between the human and the non-human, while still retaining a fidelity to the intentional-
ity or holism that characterizes phenomenological experience. 
With these opening thoughts in mind, the rest of chapter is structured into three sections. 
In section two, we define and unpack the concept of attunement, drawing upon a variety of 
different philosophical sources, including Heidegger, Radcliffe and Manning. Suggesting 
that these sources too readily reduce attunement to feeling, we argue that attunement can 
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be understood in a more literal musical sense through the notion of tuning instruments. 
From this perspective, attunement can be defined as the capacity to sense difference. 
Section three develops two ways of becoming attuned through the body in terms vibration 
and tone. This section draws upon empirical vignettes from everyday situations which reg-
ularly form the basis of social science research and shows how these concepts can be 
used to understand and become attuned to complex embodied practices. In the final con-
cluding section, we seek to show how the concept of attunement and the vocabulary de-
veloped in section three can be helpful to those in the social sciences and humanities in-
terested in cultivating embodied methodologies and methods. 
2. Attunement  
The term attunement has a number of lineages within continental philosophy and social 
theory. Rather than attempt to provide a total summary or outline of these various, often 
diverging accounts, we can draw upon three different understandings of attunement from 
three different thinkers: Heidegger, Cavell and Manning. Although these three thinkers 
utilise the term in very different ways, there are commonalities that can be drawn together 
to provide a strong basis to develop attunement as way of thinking or doing embodied 
methodology.  
According to Ratcliffe, Heidegger’s notion of attunement is linked to mood. Radcliffe asks: 
“[W]hat kind of phenomenon does ‘attunement’ identify? It is used by Heidegger 
to convey the way in which he thinks that emotion, and more specifically mood 
[Stimmung], constitutes the sense of Dasein’s [Heidegger’s term for being-there 
or human being] inextricable entanglement with contexts of worldly significance. 
Moods, for Heidegger, give sense to Dasein’s world and to the manner in which 
Dasein finds itself relating to the world. Dasein always “be-longs” to a world, 
which is first disclosed by background “moods” as a significant whole in which 
Dasein dwells (1962, p. 174)” (Ratcliffe 2002 p289).  
Attunement suggests that the way we approach things are shaped by a fundamental 
mood, which acts as the condition of possibility for what appears in the world and how it 
appears (see also Ash 2013 on Heidegger and attunement). If a person is depressed, a 
situation may present itself as lacking any potential possibility, even though others are able 
to experience the same situation as an exciting or fertile ground for the formulation of new 
relationships or job opportunities. As Radcliffe suggests, these moods are often implicit 
and backgrounded. The depressed person does not approach a situation, see that poten-
tial and then choose to ignore it. Rather, the depressed mood is so fundamental to that 
person’s perspective that the very idea of a situation containing exciting or positive poten-
tial is almost impossible to entertain. This experience is confirmed when one is simply in a 
‘bad’ or ‘good’ mood. In a ‘bad mood’ it is very difficult to remember what being in a ‘good 
mood’ is like and when in a joyous mood it is hard to imagine why we would ever enter into 
a bad one.  
At the same time, attunements are not just individual or psychological states of mind, but 
are also shared and collective. Egan, commenting on Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein, 
suggests that attunement is an implicit agreement or shared understanding that makes 
communication possible between particular people. For Cavell attunement is: 
“[A] matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, 
senses of humour and significance and of fulfillment of what is outrageous, of 
what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utter-
ance is an assertion, when an appeal , when an explanation- all the whirl of or-
ganism Wittgenstien calls ‘forms of life’ (Cavell 1976, 52 as cited in Egan 2013, 
71).  
Here attunement is a social skill as much as a fundamental mood. It is the ability to pick up 
upon other people’s mood and respond to this mood in an appropriate way, which in turn 
reinforces what is understood to be appropriate behaviour in that situation. For example, if 
one is attuned to a situation then you will be able to read others’ moods. If someone looks 
a little down you may try to lighten the mood with a joke, whereas if someone is very upset 
you may try to comfort them with a hug. In this case attunement is the capacity to sense 
the often subtle differences between these different moods. Here attunement is both a 
fundamental disposition and a kind of social savvy that is hard to formalise or codify. For 
example, trying to crack a joke to a mourning mother would not be appreciated, and trying 
to hug a work colleague because they are not smiling may seem too intimate. In this sense 
of the term, attunement is a fundamentally embodied phenomenon. This is because so 
many of the cues that dictate what is and is not appropriate in a situation are not based 
upon language or discourse, but more implicit markers, such as body language, gesture 
and tone of voice which are differentiated and expressed through the somatic corporeality 
of the body, which operate outside of purely discursive or conscious registers.   
Drawing upon the work of Stern (1985), Manning develops and emphasises the somatic 
and unconscious aspects of attunement in her own definition of the term, which links at-
tunement to the concept of affect. She explains:  
“[A]ffective attunement is a preconscious tuning-with that sparks a new set of 
relations that in turn affect how singular events express themselves in the time 
of the event. Subtle and ongoing, affective attunements ‘give much of the im-
pression of the quality of the relationship’ (Stern 1985, 141). Affective attune-
ment makes felt the activation contours of experience, the intensity, as Suzanne 
Langer would say, of virtual feeling. This links affective attunement to affective 
tonality rather than either to empathy or to the matching of behavior. Stern de-
fines this as a matching of feeling” (2013, 11).  
Indeed, where Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider attunement to be a fundamentally so-
cial or practical human phenomenon, Manning suggests that attunement can also be 
thought as a relationship between non-human things. As she argues: 
“[A]ffective attunement need not be solely located on a human scale. If con-
ceived beyond human interaction, affective attunement might well describe the 
relational environment co-created by movement and sound […] Affective at-
tunement: an open field of differentiation out of which a singularity of feeling 
emerges and merges. A tuning not of content but of expression-with” (Manning 
2013 p11).  
Manning’s reading of the term fundamentally expands the scope and reach of the concept. 
Attunement is something that emerges as humans relate socially to other humans, but 
also as objects relate to one another. Manning is keen to emphasise the materiality of the 
environment here and, crucially, emphasises the role of sound in how attunement is res-
onated or transmitted. Furthermore, rather than focus on how attunements generate imi-
tated social behaviour or enable socially appropriate responses, she points to a much 
more open sense of attunement as cultivating an “affective tonality” (ibid, 11). Here at-
tunement becomes a broader ambience of the environment itself. As Rickert argues, “am-
PLEASE CONTACT AUTHORS BEFORE CITING. 
bience […] is not an impartial medium but an ensemble of variables, forces, and elements 
that shape things in ways difficult to quantify or specify” (2013 p7). 
Manning’s use of sonic vocabulary and her explicit invocation of sound and tone is key for 
developing the concept of an ambient attunement to orientate our methodological con-
cerns as social scientists. However, while Manning develops her own implications of an 
account of attunement based upon sound and tone, we want to push the concept of at-
tunement in a slightly different direction. For methodological purposes, attunement can be 
defined as the capacity to sense, amplify and attend to difference. From this perspective, 
attunement is not just a matter of ‘feeling the vibe in a room’ and adjusting our emotional 
sensibilities to fit that vibe, but also sensitizing our bodies to appreciate and understand 
the complex material forces that structure situations, beyond the envelope of human emo-
tion.  
As such, attunement can be likened to the act of tuning a musical instrument. Tuning a 
guitar involves assigning specific pitches to each of a guitar’s six strings by either tighten-
ing or loosening those strings. In regular tuning patterns, a guitar’s strings are tuned to the 
pitches (from  the lowest pitch to the highest pitch) E, A, D, G, B and E. This standard tun-
ing allows the guitar player to place their fingers on specific frets on the guitar’s fret board 
and play combinations of notes together to form chords. In turn, playing chords and notes 
successively generates musical melodies and rhythms. Tuning an instrument requires an 
ability to listen and hear that each string is tuned to the correct pitch. Only when an instru-
ment is correctly tuned can the strings resonate in a harmonious way, which in turn allows 
music to be played upon that guitar. To play a guitar, each string must be tuned individual-
ly, while retaining the correct degree of difference between the pitch of each string. The 
pitch of each individual string only makes sense in relation to the guitar’s overall tuning 
structure (the standard structure being the notes E, A, D, G, B and E).  
Developing this concept of attunement as tuning and applying it to embodied methodology, 
we could argue that attunement is a matter of generating connections and associations 
between various parts and organs of our body in order to increase our capacity, as re-
searchers, to sense difference. As the guitar example above suggests, difference is both 
singular and relational. Difference is singular in the sense that difference is central to what 
makes an object what it is (the particular pitch of a guitar string which gives it a note), while 
also relative to other singular differences (the other differently tuned strings which allow a 
difference between these notes to be heard). 
This account of attunement as tuning develops Nast’s argument that to use the body as a 
tool in research requires “allowing our bodies to become places which ‘field’ 
difference” (1998, 94 as cited in Longhurst et al, 209). For Nast, fielding difference requires 
attending to the body as both a corporeal and material entity as well as a social and histor-
ical one. However, in contrast to Nast, our account of attunement concentrates on differ-
ence as it is realised in material and non-human objects and makes no ontological distinc-
tion between the human and the non-human. Latour gives a possible example of this kind 
of attunement in relation the “training of noses for the perfume industry” (2004 p 207). In 
his words: 
“Before the session, odours rained on the pupils without making them act, with-
out making them speak, without rendering them attentive, without arousing 
them in precise ways: any group of odours would have produced the same 
general undifferentiated effect or affect on the pupil. After the session, it is not in 
vain that odours are different, and every atomic interpolation generates differ-
ences in the pupil who is slowly becoming a ‘nose’, that is someone for whom 
odours in the world are not producing contrasts without in some ways affecting 
her. The teacher, the kit and the session are what allow differences in the 
odours to make the trainees do something different every time—instead of elicit-
ing always the same crude behaviour” (ibid p207).  
Sensing difference is not simply a matter of being able to sense the difference between 
shifting moods, such as happiness or sadness; like Latour’s trainee perfume smellers, it is 
also about learning to sense the difference between a variety of states, whether these be 
gestures, glances, finger movements or whatever else is pertinent to studying a particular 
embodied practice.  
The account of attunement proposed here is different from Heidegger, Cavell and Man-
ning’s reading of the term, because it is predicated upon understanding a particular skill, 
object, or gesture through the degrees of difference that make an object, skill or gesture 
what it is and, in turn, what makes it different from other objects, skills or gestures. Becom-
ing attuned to a situation is a matter of understanding the transmission of energy between 
material things and how they shape the body in ways that are not reducible to the percep-
tions that appear through specific sensory registers. The question is: how can researchers 
become attuned to situations in ways that are sensitive to the often micro-level differences 
that separate a skilled action from an unskilled one and which can also take account of the 
multiple sites at which that action is experienced? 
As an example, we want to explore this by thinking through how qualitative researchers 
might explore the complex material forces—both human and non-human—that influence, 
contribute to and even produce motor skills development in human babies. We want to 
think about what attunement might offer us in understanding the rapidly changing bodily 
capacities of infants as they navigate idiosyncratic paths to independent walking. Domi-
nant models of motor skills development as a progression through a linear sequence of 
‘milestones’—rolling over, sitting up, crawling, standing alone, walking unaided, etc—that 
unfolds with the passing on time do not reflect the, often idiosyncratic, processes through 
which babies learn to move on their own (Karasik et al, 2010). Instead experimental re-
search suggests that young children's bodily capacities change and adapt as they gain 
experience which allows them to perceive and adjust to the properties (or affordances) of 
the environment around them (e.g. Adolph and Avolio 2000, Gill et al 2009, Adolph et al 
2010). Surfaces, gradients, materials, gaps, heights and even the clothes that they wear 
can affect whether and how babies are able to move around on their own (see Robinson 
and Adolph 2013 for a review of this research). 
Yet, neither the affordances offered by a physical environment nor an infant's bodily capac-
ities are fixed. An environment that is unaccommodating to a creeping, commando-crawl-
ing or a bum-shuffling child may be replete with opportunities for a proficient crawler or 
walker. More than this, by gaining experience in interacting with different environments, 
children’s bodily capacities change—they learn to roll over, sit up, or cruise along the furni-
ture—and, in doing so, they are able to perceive and adapt to the new affordances they 
now perceive in otherwise familiar environments. To capture the plasticity of both sides of 
this body-environment relationship, we could think in terms of attunement to help us to 
move beyond a conceptual division between environmental affordances and bodily capaci-
ties. 
Within developmental or biomechanical movement science, researchers have tended to 
approach the task through a range of experimental procedures for measuring, quantifying 
and analysing the changing relationships between young children’s bodies and the physi-
cal properties of the environment around them (see, for example, Thelen and Smith 1996, 
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Berger et al 2007). However, these experimental procedures do not necessarily reflect the 
ways in which infants move and develop motor skills in real-world environments (Adolph et 
al 2012). Attunement might offer a useful qualitative and naturalistic approach to issues of 
infant embodiment like motor skills development. This isn’t so much an issue of designing 
innovative new tools for data collection, but of re-calibrating and re-directing the variously 
mediated ways of observing and participating in social life that social scientists employ to 
find out what people do towards, and the analyses we perform on the data we collect. We 
would direct our methods and analyses towards capturing and assessing the changing at-
tunements within the practice of learning to walk. We would focus on the encounters be-
tween material things (including human bodies) in order to discover how, not unlike La-
tour's trained perfumiers, young children learn to sense the sense the environment around 
them and the ongoing process of attunement between their increasingly mobile bodies and 
the environment around them. 
In the next section, we want to offer up two concepts that help us think more specifically 
about how researchers might become attuned to particular aspects of research situations: 
vibration and tone. These two concepts are illustrated through examples drawn from 
everyday experiences, which could potentially form (or have formed) the basis of social 
scientific research. Furthermore, these experiences can be observed or recorded using 
qualitative methods standard to social science, such as interviews, observant participation 
and video ethnography. As these vignettes will show, becoming attuned to a situation is 
less about developing new methods with which to perform social science as it is a way of 
opening and honing the capacities of our own bodies to understand and analyse the social 
world, which we can use to supplement existing qualitative methods. 
3. Two modes of Attunement 
a) Vibration 
Vibrations are a form of organised movement. From a scientific perspective, the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica defines vibrations as a: 
“periodic back-and-forth motion of the particles of an elastic body or medium, 
commonly resulting when almost any physical system is displaced from its equi-
librium condition and allowed to respond to the forces that tend to restore equi-
librium” (2013, N.P.). 
If attunement is about learning the capacity to sense difference between objects, skills and 
states of being, then vibration can be understood as the basic unit through which to under-
stand and compare these various forms of difference. This is because vibration is a form of 
movement that is common to all bodies and objects and so cuts across distinctions be-
tween the human and non-human and the organic and inorganic: vibrations can be creat-
ed by soundwaves from speakers, from tectonic plates moving together, or the cry of an 
animal or a human infant.   
According to Parisi, vibration can be understand as a basic process that enables differ-
ences to exist between objects because vibrations introduce breaks into what would be 
otherwise continuously connected matter. Referring to the work of process philosopher Al-
fred Whitehead, Parisi argues that: 
“[W]ithout vibrations [...] there can be no possibility of measurement in the phys-
ical world. Ultimately any form of measurement [...] is a counting of vibrations. 
Similarly, no physical quantities could ever exist without the prior aggregation of 
physical vibrations i.e. without these discontinuous breaks in the continuity of 
matter” (2013 p165). 
That is, vibrations are forces that produce the differences between things and allow ob-
jects to appear as separate and discrete from one another. As Parisi suggests, the notion 
of vibration does not privilege the human body as the instigator or source of movement, 
and vibrations can be expressed and experienced through a variety of mediums and mate-
rials, such as liquids or solids and through a variety of senses, such as touch, hearing and 
vision. Manning (2009) argues that vibration is also a particular kind of elastic movement, 
which emphasises the capacity for change, but also the durability and endurance of par-
ticular states of objects and bodies. For example, an object can resonate without becom-
ing displaced or torn apart. Focusing on vibration encourages us to turn away from objects 
defined via fixed boundaries and instead focus on the thresholds that constitute and sepa-
rate things from one another. Here, as Abrahhamsson and Simpson (2011)  argue, a 
threshold is not absolute but at the same time is linked to an object or body’s capacity to 
act. While a threshold can be crossed, this may also mean that the object’s capacity to act 
also changes.  
In terms of attunement and embodied methodology, vibration is about changing the scale 
at which we attend to difference and recognising that movement of any kind contains both 
a qualitative and quantitative element. Vibrations can be qualitative, barely felt experiences 
of intensity, but at the same time, the oscillations that give rise to vibrations are quantita-
tive. Parisi (2013) explains that a specific number of oscillations gives rise to a specific fre-
quency of vibration. This is not to say that social scientists should equip themselves with 
scientific measuring equipment to count the number of vibrations present in a particular 
environment or practice. Rather it is about focusing on different scales of movement in or-
der to become attuned to what is happening in a situation in a new way. 
To develop a sensitivity to vibration, it is useful to recognise the fact that most humans, to 
some extent or another, are synaesthetes. That is to say, most people experience sensory 
experience through more than one sense. While extreme synaesthetes can smell touch or 
experience color when hearing words very vividly, most of us experience this in a more 
minor, often implicit, way. For example, when watching an image of pillow on a film or tele-
vision programme, we can draw upon previous experiences of laying our heads on pillows 
to ‘feel’ that pillow. Marks (2002) argues that, in doing so we draw upon a kind haptic 
memory in order to make a connection between two seemingly divergent senses (sight 
and touch).  
We could argue that human synaesthesia is actually similar to the ways that objects inter-
act with one another. Just as humans can take one sensory input (such as sound) and 
translate it into another sense (such as color), when vibrations meet objects, the vibration 
is not simply transmitted across or through that object, but are also actively shaped by that 
body or object. In Egan’s words: “vibration connects things and creates novel relations, 
traversing dualities [...] which removes any presupposition of separate domains” (Egan 
2013 p1564). Plucking a guitar string translates one input (the motion of the string) into 
another (the sound of a specifically tuned note). To become sensitised to vibration within 
social science methodology one can begin to cultivate a synaesthetic sensitivity to different 
forms of vibration and how they form part of particular practices or objects. This is impor-
tant because it can allow us to identify when where and how vibrations translate into dif-
ferent forms of sensation and force, depending on the thing involved in an encounter (on 
the relationship between sensation, affect and force see Ash, Forthcoming).  
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In terms of method, we can use the concept of vibration to expand upon and deepen an 
account of how objects and bodies move and the effects of these movements on the bod-
ies and objects involved in a practice. For example, we can begin by identifying how ob-
jects vibrate depending on their particular deployment in a situation and analysing the 
properties of these things that, in turn, shape their capacity for vibration. Once we have 
identified and described a thing in terms of its capacity to vibrate we can then describe 
how these vibrations are organised and the possible intentions behind this organisation. 
Then we can begin to analyse the kinds of attunement these particular kinds of vibration 
encourage or discourage. For example, tactile paving is deployed in urban areas to help 
visually impaired people recognise when they are approaching a road or crossing point (on 
tactile paving see Dischinger and Filho 2012). To understand the phenomenon of tactactile 
paving using the concept of vibration, we could first describe and analyse the shape and 
spacing of the truncated domes that protrude from these forms of concrete slab. We could 
then analyse how the encounters between these domes and feet create a series of vibra-
tions that are translated into haptic and auditory sensations. We might then interview ur-
ban dwellers who walk over these slabs to understand how they experience the kinds of 
vibration generated when their feet encounter the protruding domes and how it shapes 
their experience of urban life. Finally, we might employ video methods or ethnographic 
walk-alongs (such as Degen and Rose 2012)  to study how the difference between the vi-
brations from flat paving slabs and tactile paving attune the walking body to react to these 
vibrations in different ways.  
If taken seriously, the concept of vibration also asks us to re-tune the attitudes and princi-
ples that guide our forms of analysis as well as our methods. To elucidate how such a  re-
tuning might help us to understand embodied practice, we could think about another situa-
tion, such as how young children learn through their senses in the carefully resourced en-
vironments of preschool education. Take, for example, the water play table (a common 
feature of many early childhood classrooms). The water table provides science education 
by allowing young children to explore the physical properties of water by manipulating it in 
various ways and playing with a range of different toys and tools in the water (Dighe 1992, 
Wood and Attfield 2005, Tu 2006). If we want to understand quite how and what young 
children learn from such play, we might employ ethnographic or video-ethnographic meth-
ods to observe and understand how their play changes over time.  
Attending to the relationships between the child, the water, the plastic tray and the various 
objects placed there to facilitate water play (cups, water wheels, etc) through the unit of 
vibration might help us to focus our observations on the physical interactions between all 
the objects involved in the play (both human and non-human). The vibrations within the 
water table—the waves of water sloshing around the table as they encounter hands and 
walls and funnels and boats—can help us to explore how the water play experience sensi-
tises the child to the differences between things. The vibrations themselves are not simply 
an outcome between child and water and playthings, nor does the water play simply yield 
knowledge represented in the sum of different sensory experiences. Instead, the vibrations 
themselves shape the capacities of child, water and playthings to act and to respond to the 
situation at hand. 
We might, then, want to think of vibration as a unit of sense crossing human and non-hu-
man boundaries. We may use this to encourage the development of a more experimental 
synaesthetic vocabulary to write up this account of water play. Here the vibrations pro-
duced by the water as it splashes around the play table may conjure feelings, colours or 
other affects, both literally and figurally in the child and, thus, provide an enlarged set of 
descriptors to communicate what it feels like to play, or how one learns to sense the quali-
ties and capacities of substances and materials. As a concept, vibration allows us to at-
tune to forces which both cross and unite the supposed divide between human and thing 
because vibrations are common to both human and thing. Thinking in terms of vibration as 
a unit of sense, then, is one way that we can begin to attune ourselves differently to the 
world and in doing so produce new embodied accounts of our research. 
!
b) Tone  
If vibration is understood as a unit of sense that crosses the boundaries between the hu-
man and nonhuman, then tone is way of thinking about how vibrations are organized with 
particular sensory effects in mind. Tone is not an unusual term. In everyday language we 
often refer to an inappropriate joke as lowering the tone of a situation for example. As we 
discussed earlier, for Manning, attunement is more than human forms of emotional relation 
that emerge within social situations. Certainly, “each occasion has a tone, a singular ex-
pressivity, an enjoyment” (Manning 2013 p21), but at the same time the tone of an envi-
ronment or object primes specific responses or actions to potentially occur. As Manning 
argues in relation to a fly and spider web: 
“tone...tunes the milieu to certain tendencies. A milieu with a springing motif 
tunes to air likeness, for instance. Or...fly likeness tunes not to fly as species but 
to a qualitative likeness of a fly-movement intensively in rhythm with the spider’s 
web. This likeness is first and foremost affective- it is an attunement not simply 
to the fly in its qualitative dimensions, or to its behaviours, but to the way the 
fly’s singular movement-tendencies affect the speciation spider-like (Manning 
2013 p209).  
Here the spider web and fly are separate objects, but the web itself anticipates the kinds of 
movement a fly makes and uses the fly’s tendency for movement against it in order to cap-
ture it and form the spiders food.  The spider web does not communicate with the fly on 
the level of representation or identify in the sense that the spiders web somehow identifies 
the fly as a certain species or type of being and uses that information to capture it. Rather 
the spider web, through its material structure and placement, is tuned to the fly’s affects; 
its patterns and capacities of movement and sense. Similarly, the child playing with various 
objects and materials available to them at the water table becomes ‘tuned’ to the patterns 
and physical forces at play in the water. The play does not represent these patterns and 
forces to the child, but allows that child to attune him or herself to the tone of the water in 
that particular instance of play. 
As social scientists, becoming aware of and attending to the tone of a situation involves 
recognising the tendencies that a tone potentialises. Or in other words, recognising that 
tones do not simply set moods, but also shape the kinds of possible futures that can 
emerge from a situation, albeit in an open and non-deterministic way. The implications of 
this approach can be unpacked through a method of data collection that is very familiar in 
the social sciences: participant observation. Atkinson and Hammerly suggest that partici-
pant observation is “a mode of being-in-the-world characteristic of researchers” (2005, 
p249), whereby life is observed through the researcher being involved, either directly or 
indirectly, in the practice or activity that constitutes a social situation.  
Manning’s account of tone could help better attune a participant observer in a number of 
ways. Imagine the researcher was studying a coffee shop to understand how brand 
awareness and loyalty was created between coffee shop and customer. The researcher 
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could map the layout of the space to see what kind of movement it constrained and afford-
ed, or record the perceived age, race and gender of the coffee shop customers, the length 
of their visit and so on. The researcher may begin to notice repeating tendencies of action 
that happen in the coffee shop, but have difficulty trying to pinpoint why these tendencies 
have a durability that seems to exceed particular categories or groups of people. Looking 
again, the researcher could focus on the particular ensemble of objects that made up the 
coffee shop environment, such as the particular kinds of material used on different areas 
of flooring or the textures of the seat covers or design of the arms of the chairs in the shop.   
Recognising that the shop is part of a multi-national chain, the researcher may come to 
appreciate that each object has been specifically designed and chosen to create a setting 
or atmosphere that the chains owners and interior designers think is most conducive to the 
purchasing of coffee. From this perspective the environment does not simply afford or 
constrain particular actions, but also emits a particular tone. This tone is not simply about 
setting a convivial or relaxed mood or emotional state in the bodies of the coffee shop, but 
about tuning the milieu of the coffee shop to attempt to generate particular tendencies. In 
the case of the coffee shop, the tendency could be the development of a form of brand 
awareness and loyalty between customer and brand. For example, the mugs at this multi-
national chain of coffee houses  have an embossed logo on the cups side, but also at the 
top of the cups handle, which allows one to literally feel out and be in contact with the 
brand through the simple act of holding the cup. The large diameter of the mug also dis-
tributes the heat of the liquid across a broader area than other coffee mugs. The heat of 
the liquid is therefore less intense and lowers the possibility of burning one’s lips. In doing 
so, the mug becomes more welcoming for the wary drinker. In a similar manner, the over-
sized handle on the cup distributes the weight of the mug more evenly in the hand, making 
it easier to hold and gesture with the mug. 
Again, the tone of the cup is not designed to work on a representational level, but to link 
the affects of the human hand (its capacity to grip, its capacity to sense the differences in 
surface profiles) to the affects of the cup (its capacity to distribute heat, its capacity to re-
tain the surface protrusions embossed on it) in ways that generate associations between 
the customers body and the brands and product they are consuming. Of course, the coffee 
shop is made up of a huge number of objects, of which the cup is only one. Attending to 
the tone of the shop would therefore involve attending to all the objects that make up the 
shop, alongside their relationally emergent affects. Together, the tone of the cup, the floor, 
the tables and so on work to tune the possibilities for the customers in the store. Just as a 
musical tone has a temporal extension in time, the tone of the shop creates a background 
hum of affects, through which particular actions appear more or less desirable, quite inde-
pendently of the people that enter and leave the shop. The tone of the coffee shop is de-
liberately designed to prime possible futures around returning to the shop on another day, 
or ordering another drink or associating the brand with a particular sense of calm when 
one recalls the logo on adverts outside of the shop.  
A number of methods could be used to study and understand the tone of an object or prac-
tice. In relation to the coffee shop mug, if we accept that tones shape the potential of future 
tendencies, we could use time-lapse video or other forms of video method (see Simpson 
2012, Laurier and Philo 2006) to record how the mug is used within the shop and the kinds 
of futures that the object encourages. In turn we could compare how different coffee shop 
customers deal with and use the same cup. By comparing a number of different peoples 
engagement with the same object we could begin to understand how effective or ‘strong’ 
an objects tone is in generating more or less uniform responses or associations. We might 
then interview coffee shop customers and show them the video to encourage them to re-
flect on the tone of the cup and the kinds of association it cultivates between sensory ex-
perience and particular brand discourses and logos.  
Lisa Baraitser’s autoethnographic work on the experience of the encumbered “mother-
plus-baby-plus-buggy-plus-stuff” who is attempting to navigate across the city to visit her 
mother (2009, p. 148) is also suggestive of ways in which tone might help us to develop 
embodied methodologies. Baraitser explains that the encumbered mother is exposed to 
the materiality of the landscape and she must improvise creative responses to it on a mo-
ment-to-basis; she must find a way to navigate through an inhospitable landscape of too-
high kerbs and busy roads, stairs and barriers which conspires to prevent or prolong her 
journey: 
Though impeded and weighed down by her objects, each obstacle she encoun-
ters forces her to renegotiate her relationship with another set of objects: a kerb, 
stair, entrance, doorway, stranger. She can balk at it, but if she wants to move 
about the city she must ultimately find a way through. [… S]he may deliberately 
make light of the difficulty of her stunts, may not even consciously be aware that 
she navigates them on a moment-by-moment basis. She too engages with the 
material elements of the city; sees with fresh eyes both the broken and rude el-
ements, and the occasional objects that reciprocate back. (2009, p. 150). 
Baraitser argues that experience that is “both burdensome” yet “oddly generative” (2009, 
p. 150). Very productively, she draws upon the notion of viscosity (drawn from the proper-
ties of matter) to help to make sense of this embodied experience of motherhood. Thinking 
in terms of attunement might help us to further explore how mother, baby, buggy and stuff 
encounter, respond to and affect the many tones of the city, both pleasant and unpleasant. 
This could help us to understand , not just what the mother perceives and experiences in 
the environment around her, but the processes of exchange and adaptation between the 
many human and non-human objects that make up the environment. 
Like the concept of vibration, attuning our bodies as researchers to sense and piece to-
gether the tone of an environment is not necessarily about developing some new method 
of accounting for objects or things. Rather it is a matter of cultivating our bodies to become 
sensitive to often overlooked or ignored minor details, that while seeming inconsequential 
actually matter a great deal. Attunement is a process of developing a sensitivity to notice 
the difference between laminate or real hardwood flooring, or the difference between dif-
ferent textures of plastic used in disposable cutlery. It is these details which give objects 
their tone. In turn,  these tones work together to generate assemblages of sensation of 
feeling-seeing-smelling-hearing, in ways that appear unified, fixed and given to conscious-
ness, in order to produce particular kinds of affect in an attempt to realise particular pre-
conditioned futures. Again, this does not mean we simply exhaustively describe the prop-
erties of objects, but rather examine how these properties are designed to work on the 
level of affect, alongside the haptic and often unreflected upon somatic knowledges of the 
body.  
!
4. Conclusion: Attunement as Embodied Methodology 
Becoming attuned to a situation requires a turn away from focusing on specific sensory 
faculties, or of understanding sense experience as constituted by the sum of our individual 
senses. In its place, the chapter has argued for a model of embodied methodology based 
on attunement. Taking the concept of attunement seriously encourages us to concentrate 
PLEASE CONTACT AUTHORS BEFORE CITING. 
on relations between body and world as a process on material exchange, translation and 
differentiation between a variety of human and non-human objects, rather than a gathering 
and organisation of forces by something called  human perception or cognition.  
Practically put, attunement asks us to focus on what appears to the researcher within a 
given situation, while at the same time speculatively inquiring about how objects and 
forces appear to and shape each other as well. Here object-object relations are seen as 
equally important as human-object relations. Cultivating a sensitivity to the non-human and 
breaking down categorical distinctions between humans and non-humans involves a mod-
esty on the part of the researcher in the sense that one should not assume that human be-
ings are necessarily the most important actor in shaping what happens within an event or 
situation. Developing new units of ‘sense’ that cross between the human and non-human, 
such as vibration, encourages researchers to focus on the points of intersection where 
bodies and objects meet in ways that do not reduce these encounters to brute physical or 
causal interactions. As we have argued, it is through these very encounters that the re-
search field become sensible and intelligible to the human subject studying it.  
As such, the concept of attunement is an umbrella term for thinking about how to orientate 
ourselves towards empirical research and research methods, through sensitising our bod-
ies to pay attention and focus on difference. Here, concepts such as tone and vibration are 
not ideas divorced from the world, nor are they heady abstractions. From this perspective, 
concepts can be used in a productive and inventive way to generate connections between 
seemingly disparate realms in order to open up new ways to think and understand social 
life. At the same time these concepts should not be considered prescriptive. Vibration and 
tone are two ways to become attuned to the world in a different way, but are certainly not 
the only ways. With this ethos in mind, and continuing with the sonic metaphor, how might 
we attune ourselves to the volume or pitch of an event and how would those concepts en-
able us to experience social phenomenon differently? If methodology is a series of choices 
about what information and data we attempt to gather and how that data is analysed, then 
attunement encourages a focus on the micro scales of material relation, in which humans 
and their sense capacities are only a very small part.  
!
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